Israel’s First Lifeline
By Anton Riehle
Anti-Israel thought leaders often argue that if it weren’t for the United States’ support, Israel would cease to exist. And indeed, this argument isn’t without merit. The flow of approximately 3.3 billion USD of military aid annually over the course of 10 years remains instrumental in keeping the Israel Defense Forces’ artillery up to date. The flaw in this argument is the fact that until the Nixon administration signed off on a large arms shipment during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, U.S. financial and military aid to Israel was slim to none. In fact, during the 1967 war, the Jordanian army used U.S.-manufactured artillery against Israel. So who really assisted the fledgling nation in those early years? Perhaps one could point to the support Israel enjoyed from France in the 1950s, leading to the creation of a nuclear program in Israel with the help of Charles de Gaulle. In 1967, the Israeli air force consisted almost entirely of French-manufactured mystéres. Or perhaps Czechoslovakia was the key to Israel’s victory in the 1948 independence war, providing much-needed weaponry to the Yishuv and training pilots of the first-ever fighter unit of the Israel Air Force. These were all largely bilateral relationships that always involved a transaction of sorts, but the foreign support that brought Israel out of its darkest days was of a different kind.
By 1952, Israel found itself in the midst of an economic crisis. Relations with the Soviet Union had cooled and the United States remained distant. Surrounding Arab states maintained airtight embargoes, making importing and exporting difficult. It was at this point that David Ben-Gurion entered into talks with West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer over the prospect of reparations. The talks would be known as the Jewish Material Claims Conference, and would involve testimony from Holocaust survivors. In 1953, a resolution was passed in the German Bundestag that would pay out 822 million U.S. dollars ($9.3 billion adjusted for inflation) to Israel over the course of twelve years.
In Germany, this agreement was dubbed “Wiedergutmachung,” a compound word consisting of wieder — (again,) gut — (good,) machung — (inf. To make). It would roughly translate to “making good again.” In the delightful creativity and versatility of the German language, a rather monumental insult: suggesting that the Holocaust, and therefore the relationship between Germany and the Jews, could be “made good again.”
This was unsurprisingly viewed as a slap in the face by many Jews in the world, sparking riots throughout Israel, led by future Prime Minister Menachem Begin, which ultimately resulted in an insurrection in the Knesset in January 1952. Opposition to the reparations package was fierce, with underground Irgun fighters even attempting to murder German chancellor Konrad Adenauer with a letterbomb. In spite of all this resistance, the reparations package went through, providing a vital boost to the Israeli economy at a time when approximately 85% of the gross national product was being directed towards defense spending. It was a painful dilemma — the choice between rescuing the young state’s economy, or rejecting the German ‘blood money’ on moral principles. The knesset voted to approve the reparations with a vote of 61–50. It was a complicated decision, with much of the West German public opposing the reparations and the Arab league breaking off relations with West Germany.
The arrival of the reparations assisted in stabilizing the Israeli economy in the 50s, and were helpful towards infrastructure, with German rail manufacturers supplying the Israel railways authorities with locomotives and rail cars. Regardless, the term Wiedergutmachung remained quite the overstatement, as most Israelis, including the government, remained disdainful towards Germany, not establishing diplomatic relations until 1965.
As it turned out, the West Germans were not able to fulfill their promise of making things good again and mending its relationship with the Jewish people, beginning with the botched response to the 1972 Munich Massacre, along with its coverup. Even though West German authorities arrested three of the perpetrators and killed two more in the standoff, the same West German authorities were willing to turn the other cheek during the hijacking of Lufthansa flight 615, freeing the remaining terrorists in a matter of hours. This is not to mention the collaboration between German and Palestinian hijackers on Air France 139, and the relationship between the PLO and the German leftist Baader-Meinhof terrorist organization. With all of the aforementioned factors taken into consideration, West Germany before reunification was actually quietly belligerent to Israel in many ways.
The Israel-West Germany relationship was one clouded by mistrust and the looming shadow of the Holocaust. While the government of Adenauer insisted upon admitting guilt and making an attempt to make some sort of compensation for the atrocities committed by their predecessor, these moves were ultimately partially offset by underhanded transgressions and quiet collaboration with terrorism against Israel. As such, the claim that monetary reparations given to Israel were a form of wiedergutmachung became illegitimate, if it ever had any legitimacy to begin with. It serves as an interesting, if not disturbing case study in the long-term fallout of guilt, remorse, and making amends.
